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Many Muslim-majority countries do not provide adequate protection 
for dissent of any sorts—religious, social, or political. In the realm of reli-
gious dissent, these countries persecute not just non-Muslims, but in fact, 
the persecution is harshest and most frequent against Muslims who dissent 
from the state’s interpretation of Islam. The results are profound: regular 
incidents of arson, murder, and harassment, and on a broader scale, spiritu-
al and intellectual stagnation. 
In looking for ways to protect dissent generally, the starting point is to 
protect intragroup dissent, with the “group” defined as the Muslim com-
munity. Protecting the right of Muslims—who pose the greatest threat to a 
state bent on using Islam to serve its political ends—to disagree with the 
state’s interpretation and misuse of Islam will pave the way to protection of 
minority religious rights. And Muslim themselves are key to this effort to 
protect dissent by other Muslims—outside influences from non-Muslims 
will be perceived, and rejected, as not just irrelevant, but threatening. 
This paper contributes to a growing legal literature about the ways that 
dissenters within Muslim communities contest dominant interpretations of 
Islam.1 It does so by focusing particular attention on intra-Muslim disa-
greement about the proper scope of religious freedom. 
In Part I, this paper will explore the widespread persecution of in-
tragroup dissenters in Muslim-majority countries, with case examples from 
three of the worst global offenders: Pakistan, Indonesia, and Egypt. It will 
* Legal Counsel at The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and Founder and Editor-in-Chief of altmus-
limah.com. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Becket Fund 
or altmuslimah.com. Portions of the article were previously prepared by the author for a report issued 
by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, and are used here with permission. 
 1.  E.g., Hassan El-Menyawi, Same-sex Marriage in Islamic Law, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
375 (2012); Nusrat Choudhury, Comment, Constrained Spaces for Islamic Feminism: Women’s Rights 
and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155 (2007); Madhavi Sunder, 
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1433-57 (2003); Abdullahi An-Na’im, Human Rights in the 
Muslim World, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990). Also see generally Holning Lau, The Language of 
Westernization in Legal Commentary, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 507 (2013) (discussing reforms spurred by 
internal dissent in non-Western parts of the world). 
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examine the relationship between government restrictions on religion and 
social hostilities, and will argue that, if a government seeks public order, it 
must give its citizens broad freedoms. In Part II, the paper will examine 
intragroup discourse on religious freedom, and make a case for why and 
how intragroup actors are essential to reforming the persecutory laws. 
I. GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS AND SOCIAL HOSTILITIES
A recent report by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and 
Public Life, titled Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion,
shows that a staggering 5.1 billion people, roughly three-quarters of the 
world’s population, live in countries where religious freedom is severely 
limited, either by the government or by private social actors.2Of the twen-
ty-five most populous countries in the world, Muslim-majority countries 
(Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia) constitute three of the four worst offend-
ers with the most restrictions on religion.3 Moreover, the situation in these 
countries does not show signs of improvement: in 2013, Egypt and Paki-
stan both recorded the highest scores for government restrictions and social 
hostilities, respectively, of any country in the five-year history of the 
study.4
The Global Restrictions study measures restrictions on religion in 198 
countries and territories using two indexes: The Government Restrictions 
Index (GRI) “measures government laws, policies and actions that restrict 
religious beliefs or practices,”5 while the Social Hostilities Index (SHI) 
“measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations 
and social groups.”6 It also categorizes the levels of government re-
strictions and social hostilities in each country by percentiles; as the 
benchmark, it uses the results from the baseline year (the year ending in 
 2.  BRIAN J. GRIM ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ARAB SPRING ADDS TO GLOBAL 
RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION, 10 (June 2013), available at
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/06/RestrictionsIV-web.pdf;
see also TEDxTalks, The Numbers of Religious Freedom: Brian J. Grim at TEDxViadellaConcilia-
zione, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQvDUTOOkiI [hereinafter 
Religious Freedom at TEDx]. Here, “severely limited” translates to living in a country with a mark of 
“high” or “very high” restrictions on religion. 
 3.  GRIM ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. 
 4.  Id.
 5.  Id. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to 
ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more 
religious groups. 
 6.  Id. This includes religion-related armed conflict or terrorism, mob or sectarian violence, 
harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI 
includes 13 measures of social hostilities. 
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mid-2007).7 Scores in the top 5% on each index in mid-2007 were catego-
rized as “very high.”8
Over the five years studied, eleven countries have crossed the thresh-
old into “very high” levels of government restrictions (as delineated by the 
top five percent of the 2007 index)—ten of these countries have Muslim 
majorities.9 Muslim-majority representation in the “very high government 
restrictions” category is now sixteen out of twenty.10 Looking at trends in 
the other index, five of the seven countries where social hostilities reached 
“very high” levels were also home to Muslim majorities, taking the total 
count of Muslim-majority countries with “very high” social hostilities to 
ten, out of fourteen.11
Breaking the world up into regional units uncovers more evidence of 
the Muslim world’s religious intolerance. The Middle East-North Africa 
region, almost exclusively Muslim, had the largest share of countries with 
increases of one point or more (30%) on either the government restrictions 
or social hostilities index, and the largest share of countries showing any 
increase (75%).12 The Global Restrictions report specifically notes that 
government restrictions on religion remained high or very high in the coun-
tries that participated in the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions.13
Among the world’s twenty-five most populous countries, Pakistan was 
the only one in which government restrictions increased by one full point 
or more.14 Meanwhile, social hostilities increased by one point or more in 
four countries—two of these countries, Indonesia and Pakistan, have large 
Muslim majorities.15
All these data paint a picture of a Muslim world that has tremendous 
difficulty guaranteeing religious freedom to its citizens. This is the case, 
despite the fact that the Quran, the bedrock text of the Islamic faith revered 
by 1.6 billion Muslims as the ineffable word of God, provides unwavering 
scriptural support for religious freedom: Students of Islam are familiar with 
the Qur’anic exhortation “There is no compulsion in religion,”16 and in one 
 7.  Id. at 54. 
 8.  Id.
 9.  Id. at 13. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 14. 
 12.  Id. at 9. 
 13.  Id. at 9, 12. 
 14.  Id. at 25 n.10. 
 15.  Id. at 27 n.14. 
 16.  Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 2: Al-Baqara (The Cow), CENTER FOR MUSLIM-HEWISH 
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/002-qmt.php#002.256 (verse 
002.256) (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).  
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of the most commonly memorized passages for recitation in daily prayer, 
God instructs his believers to “Say: O you who reject faith, I do not wor-
ship what you worship, nor do you worship what I worship. . .To you be 
your religion, and to me be mine.”17 Yet this original commandment clear-
ly does not correlate with the on-the-ground situation in Muslim-majority 
countries. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran top the list of countries with the 
overall highest levels of restriction on religion.18
At the core of the problem are the laws of these countries. Many have 
blasphemy and other anti-religious freedom laws on the books, which the 
government as well as private actors apply in a discriminatory and abusive 
manner. Many Muslim-majority countries stifle intra-religious dissent—
dissent on social and theological matters internal to the religious communi-
ty—at the expense of individual human rights, claiming that restrictions on 
religious expression are necessary to the maintenance of public order. In 
fact, the opposite seems true. The Pew Forum research shows that greater 
legal restrictions lead to greater social hostilities, which, when manifested 
through violence and aggression, create tremendous public disorder. This 
paper digs deeper to uncover why the two are correlated. 
In the remainder of Part I, this paper will first explore why social hos-
tilities and government restrictions often go hand-in-hand, and, in Section 
B, will provide examples of several Muslim-majority states where the law 
has helped create a culture of impunity. Section C will look at how restric-
tive laws prevent both spiritual and intellectual flourishing, and Section D 
will connect these laws to radicalism. 
A. Why Do Social Hostilities Correlate with Government Restrictions? 
As defined in the Global Restrictions report, the term “social hostili-
ties” refers to restrictions on an individual’s free exercise of religion that 
are enforced by private, not governmental, actors: individuals, organiza-
tions and social groups.19 These include mob violence against minority 
religions or sects and acts of religion-related terrorism. They also include 
more subtle hostilities such as workplace discrimination and propagation of 
anti-religious speech. Although these subtle machinations of repression are 
almost certainly more widespread and pervasive, the most intense, destruc-
tive, and measurable hostilities manifest as religion-related terrorism and 
 17.  Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 109: Al-Kafiroon (The Disbelievers, Atheists), CENTER FOR 
MUSLIM-JEWISH ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/109-
qmt.php#109.001 (verses 109.001-006) (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
 18.  GRIM ET AL., supra note 2, at 72, 75.
 19.  GRIM ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
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violence between religious groups. These latter acts of social hostility pro-
vide measurable data. Yet an appreciation of the damage caused by both 
varieties is essential to a full understanding of the scope and breadth of the 
problem of religious intolerance. 
The Global Restrictions data show a positive correlation between the 
level of government restrictions on religion and the level of social hostili-
ties towards religion in a country. While correlation does not imply causa-
tion, one particular aspect of this correlation seems to be illuminating: by 
far, the type of government restriction with the greatest predictive power in 
terms of producing high levels of social hostility is a government policy 
that clearly favors one religion, to the detriment or exclusion of another. 
What might explain this relationship? The answer is twofold: 
1. By using the power of the law to condemn a religious minority group, 
states empower a vigilante attitude among adherents of the dominant and 
favored religion. 
2. By denying disfavored religious groups access to the free and open 
“marketplace of ideas” that represents mainstream discourse, states con-
tribute to the alienation, depression, and radicalization of some members 
of their society, while recklessly neglecting (or actively stifling) invalua-
ble opportunities for organic beneficial social reform. 
The following sections will examine these two in turn. 
B. The Erosion of Law and Order: Incentivizing Violence Through Inaction 
1. Pakistan 
Pakistan has the most extensive blasphemy provisions in the world. 
These laws are widely abused, encompassing more than religious state-
ments—Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are often used to settle vendettas and 
property disputes. And people have been sentenced to long jail terms on 
extremely weak evidence, some of which cannot even be examined in court 
for fear of repeating the alleged blasphemy.20
Even mere criticism of the blasphemy laws is met with violence. In 
January 2011, Salman Taseer, the former governor of Pakistan’s most pop-
ulous province and a public critic of the blasphemy laws, was gunned down 
by a member of his security detail. Many of Pakistan’s most influential 
religious leaders and a majority of its religious population hailed his mur-
 20.  Id. at 82.
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derer a hero. His crime: speaking out in favor of tolerance and against the 
tyranny of the blasphemy laws.21
This continuing violence shows how anti-religious freedom laws help 
create a climate of impunity—murderers are not only left unpunished, but 
are in many cases celebrated. The government, afraid of retribution by 
extremist groups, refrains from punishing these criminals, while religious 
minorities and dissidents continue to be arrested and jailed merely for prac-
ticing their faith. 
The problem extends beyond assassinations. In Pakistan, systematic 
persecution of religious minorities is alarmingly well documented, and the 
Ahmadiyya Muslim community is arguably its greatest victim. Ahmadis 
consider themselves Muslims although Sunni and Shia Muslims disagree 
because of the group’s variant belief about the finality of Prophet Muham-
mad’s prophethood. 
In February 2012, Abdul Qudoos, a schoolteacher and the president of 
a chapter of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Rabwah, was illegally 
detained and spent forty-six days in custody.22 Police brutally tortured 
Qudoos to force him to confess to a murder he did not commit. No charges 
were ever brought against him for this murder, nor was there any evidence 
connecting him to the crime.23 He was also pushed to implicate the Ahmad-
iyya leadership in other invented crimes,24 despite the complete lack of 
evidence they were involved in any such activity. While in custody, police 
hung him upside down to beat him, before pinning him to the floor as they 
pressed a weighted wooden roller over him.25 After forty-six days of this 
brutality, Qudoos was released without charge. He died soon after, a result 
of internal injuries suffered at the hands of murderous policemen.26
Qudoos suffered the punishment that his community is long used to. 
In May of 2010, gunmen entered two Ahmadi mosques during Friday pray-
 21.  Pakistan Minorities Minister Shot Dead in Islamabad, TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 2 2011),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-02/pakistan/28646082_1_blasphemy-liberal-
pakistanis-and-rights-minorities. 
 22.  Pakistan: In a Hate Campaign Against the Ahmadis the Police Tortured to Death an Innocent 
School Teacher, ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/AHRC-UAC-057-2012.
 23.  Usman Ahmad, A Murder Most Foul: How Master Abdul Qudoos was Tortured and Killed,
PAK TEA HOUSE (Apr. 2, 2012), http://pakteahouse.net/2012/04/02/a-murder-most-most-foul-how-
master-abdul-qudoos-was-tortured-and-killed/. 
 24.  UK: Shaheed Master Abdul Qudoos Death by Torture Matter Raised during Parliamentary 
Q&A, AHMADIYYA TIMES (Apr. 30, 2012), http://ahmadiyyatimes.blogspot.com/2012/04/uk-shaheed-
master-abdul-qudoos-death-by.html. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id.
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er in Lahore, Pakistan and attacked the assembled worshipers.27 The gun-
men used grenades, shot AK-47s and detonated suicide vests, claiming 94 
lives and injuring more than 100 people.28
Sadly, Pakistan holds no monopoly on intra-Muslim persecution of 
those deemed a “danger” to Sunni Islam, as defined by the State. 
2. Indonesia 
The world’s most populous Muslim country is no stranger to religious 
strife. For an Ahmadi, it might be the only country in the world less hospi-
table than Pakistan. In Indonesia, society categorically bans the Ahmadiyya 
from public life.29 Persecution against Christians also remains a problem. 
The country grapples with the continued threat of religiously-motivated 
violence as well as the implementation of Shariah law. 
Like Pakistan, Indonesia imposes severe restrictions on the Ahmadiy-
ya community. On June 9, 2008, the Government announced a joint minis-
terial decree freezing the activities of the Ahmadiyya Qadiyani and 
prohibiting vigilantism against the group.30 The decree was short of the 
outright ban called for by hard line groups and the Coordinating Board for 
Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor Pakem), a government-
appointed Islamist body which sits in the Attorney General’s office.31 The 
Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Religion, and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs signed the decree.32
Even before the government passed the decree, Bakor Pakem had rec-
ommended government dissolution of the Ahmadiyya. On April 16, 2008, 
Bakor Pakem’s recommendation declared the Ahmadiyya heretical and 
deviant, citing a 1965 presidential instruction on the “prevention of misuse 
and disgrace of religion.”33
Private Sunni Muslim groups also contributed to the effort. The Indo-
nesian Council of Ulamas (MUI) released a number of fatwas (religious 
 27.  BANYAN, State Persecution and Pakistan’s Ahmadi Sect: We Decide Whether You’re Muslim 
or Not, THE ECONOMIST (June 10, 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/06/state_per
secution_and_pakistans_ahmadi_sect. 
 28.  Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis. 
 29.  FREEDOM HOUSE, POLICING BELIEF: THE IMPACT OF BLASPHEMY LAWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
48-49 (2010), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Policing_Belief_Full.pdf. 
 30.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: SEC’Y FOR CIVILIAN SEC., Indonesia: International Religious Freedom 
Report 2008, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108407.htm (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2014). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id.
 33.  Id.
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decrees) in recent years on the issue of “deviance” from mainstream Islam, 
including recommendations to ban the Ahmadiyya, which were influential 
in enabling official and social discrimination against the Ahmadiyya and 
other minority religious groups during the reporting period.34
The Joint Decree was the product of the culture of fear created, per-
petuated, and legitimized by the Blasphemy Act. The Act enables and en-
courages such persecutory measures by inviting the violation of religious 
freedom and free speech in the name of preventing so-called “religious 
defamation”—that is, denigrating language about religions. Though propo-
nents of such defamation prohibitions offer the pretense of balancing reli-
gious freedom and free speech on one hand, with respect for religious 
persons on the other, the actual effects of such policies are unambiguously 
discriminatory, belying their proponents’ pretense to evenhandedness. The 
Blasphemy Act promotes not respect, but religious intolerance, which has 
devastating repercussions for dissenters and adherents of minority faiths. 
The intolerance is also detrimental to the development of a democratic 
culture guided by pluralist values and respect for different faiths. In the 
absence of such a civic culture, the struggle for democratic legal proce-
dures faces a difficult future. 
3.  Egypt 
Egypt has recently proven a constantly changing state, given the Arab 
Spring and the recent overthrow of the democratically-elected Mohammed 
Morsi. Morsi’s reign as President saw a repetition of the same kind of Sun-
ni-preferential behavior consistent with that described in Pakistan and In-
donesia and it continued a pattern of oppression that existed under 
Mubarak.35
During Mubarak’s regime, Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code 
prohibited acts that “exploit[ed] religion in order to promote or advocate 
extremist ideologies by word of mouth, in writing or in any other manner 
with a view to stirring up sedition, disparaging or belittling any divinely-
revealed religion or its adherents, or prejudicing national unity or social 
harmony.”36 “Divinely-revealed religion” referred to Islam, Christianity, 
34.  Id.
 35.  Mohamed Elmenshawy, Sectarianizing Egypt’s Foreign Policy, AL-MONITOR (Mar. 19, 
2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/morsi-egypt-sectarian-foreign-policy-
muslim-bortherhood.html#. 
 36.  Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 7/2002 (Egypt), Sept. 3, 2001, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1, 59th Sess., Item 11(b) (Jan. 24, 2003), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/105/53/PDF/G0310553.pdf; Asma T. Uddin, Blasphemy Laws in 
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and Judaism, the three religions recognized in Egypt. The statute mandated 
a fine and up to five years’ imprisonment. Article 178, which allowed up to 
two years’ imprisonment, penalized such violations of “public morality” as 
“immoral songs, shouting, or speeches.”37 Other sections prohibited the 
printing of unofficial religious texts, public ridicule of religious groups, or 
incitement to hatred of religious groups.38
These statutes were used to stifle dissent even among Egypt’s majority 
Sunni community if those in power perceive their religious or political 
stances as threatening the political status quo. Al-Azhar professor and 
Qur’an scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who advocated for a historically 
contextual interpretation of the Qur’an that tended to improve women’s 
rights,39 found himself in perhaps a unique situation: the Cairo Appeals 
Court declared him an apostate40 and then issued a mandatory divorce be-
cause an apostate cannot remain married to a Muslim.41 He and his wife 
subsequently fled to Europe.42
The government has also harassed the minority Shi’a community. In 
2009, Shi’a cleric Hassan Shehata Moussa was arrested on charges of “us-
ing Friday sermons in promoting his Shiite ideals, recruiting foreign ele-
ments, leading a banned group, receiving financial support from foreign 
governments, [and] possessing books defaming the Sunnis.”43 The Egyp-
tian authorities questioned his ties to Iran and refused to allow defense 
lawyers or human rights groups to attend parts of the investigation.44 He 
was released in March 2010; eight of the eleven arrested with him remain 
in prison.45
Egyptian authorities have also harassed the Qur’anists for decades. 
Basing themselves on the belief that the Qur’an is the only valid sacred 
text, as opposed to the majority Muslim belief that both the Qur’an and the 
Muslim-Majority Countries, REV. OF FAITH & INT’L, AFF. no. 2, 2011, at 47, 51 (2011), available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15570274.2011.571423#.UxobuvldU8I. 
 37.  Uddin, supra note 36, at 52. 
 38.  Id.
 39.  Nadia Abou El-Magd, When the Professor Can’t Teach, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (June 15, 
2000), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/486/eg6.htm. 
 40.  Id.
 41.  Id.
 42.  Id.
 43.  Amro Hassan, Egypt: Cleric Backed by Iran Charged in Egypt, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 2009, 
12:33 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/07/egypt-security-detains-12-accuses-
hundreds-of-spreading-shiism.html. 
 44.  Id.
 45.  U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/book%20with%20cover%20for%20web.pdf. 
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hadith are the core sacred texts,46 this minority refuses to affiliate with 
either the Sunnis or the Shi’as.47 Egypt’s government-funded religious 
orthodoxy,48 such as Sheikh Mohamed Sayed Tantawi (former Grand 
Sheikh of al-Azhar), who argued that “the law clearly places limitations on 
matters of faith” and that the state’s security forces should be permitted to 
arrest those who tarnish Islam’s image,49 has endorsed the government’s 
restrictions. In 1985, the Qur’anists’ leader, Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour, 
was forced out of his assistant professorship in Muslim history at al-Azhar; 
in 2002, he sought asylum in the United States.50
Since that event, the government has harassed those who hold beliefs 
similar to those of the Qur’anists, who form a loose community, “a school 
of thought, not a movement or a group.”51 For example, blogger Reda Ab-
delrahman was arrested October 5, 2008, just weeks after five other impris-
oned Qur’anists were released,52 for expounding upon his religious beliefs 
concerning the Qur’an and the illegitimacy of hadith.53 He was beaten, 
deprived of food, and subjected to electric shocks until he gave up his per-
sonal email account’s password, and made false confessions.54 Questioned 
 46.  About Us, INT’L QURANIC CENTER, http://www.ahl-alQur’an.com/English/aboutus.php (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014)). 
 47.  Id.
 48.  Sarah A. Topol, Cairo’s Revered Al-Azhar University Now Overshadowed by TV Imams,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2010/0409/Cairo-s-revered-Al-Azhar-University-now-overshadowed-by-TV-imams. 
 49.  Karim El-Khashab, Matters of Faith, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (July 5, 2007), 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/852/eg12.htm; Sheikh Tantawi passed away in 2010, and his successor 
Shaikh Ali Tayyeb has recently endorsed a proposal for a more secular, tolerant Egyptian state. Mostafa 
Ali, Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam Declares Support for a Constitutional, Democratic State, AHRAMONLINE
(June 20, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/14672/Egypt/Politics-/AlAzhars-Grand-
Imam-declares-support-for-a-constit.aspx. The proposal, the Al-Azhar Document, attracted criticism 
from both the conservatives who say it abandons Islam, and liberals who say it does not sufficiently 
protect minorities. Heba Fahmy, Scholars Call for Inclusion of All Beliefs in Azhar Document as Others 
Slam It, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (July 14, 2011), http://thedailynewsegypt.com/people/scholars-call-for-
inclusion-of-all-beliefs-in-azhar-document-as-others-slam-it.html. The document only names Muslims, 
Jews, and Christians as explicitly protected; it is unclear whether the protections afforded Muslims will 
extend in practice to Qur’anists who are not considered Muslim by other mainstream groups. Ali 
Tayyeb did, however, disapprove of those “who use religion to incite sectarian strife or those who 
accuse others of religious apostasy simply based on political disagreements.” Ali, supra note 49. 
 50.  Salonaz Sami, Newsreel: Spare the Children, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (June 28, 2007), 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/851/eg8.htm. 
 51.  Michael Slackman, Arrests in Egypt Point Toward a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/world/africa/15egypt.html. 
 52.  Almasry Alyoum, The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights Requests the Release of the 
Qur’anist Detainee, AHL-ALQUR’AN, http://www.ahl-alQur’an.com/English/show_news.php?main_
id=3896 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
 53.  Id.
 54.  Noha Atef, Egyptian Qur’anist Blogger Released, GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY (Jan. 30, 
2009), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2009/01/30/egyptian-Qur’anist-blogger-released/. 
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twice about his Qur’anist ideas and charged with “contempt for the Muslim 
Faith,” he was freed on January 23, 2009.55
Government restrictions on religious freedom—often justified as nec-
essary to maintain public order in a Muslim majority society—are very 
often contributing factors to public disorder, because they incentivize pri-
vate violence against religious minorities. Although anti-blasphemy stat-
utes are often faith-neutral on their face, purporting to protect all religions 
from public denigration or “defamation,” in practice, these laws are rarely 
if ever enforced against the locally predominant sect of Islam. They are 
only enforced against religious minorities, including Muslim subgroups, 
often to the exclusion of any minority right to free exercise.56 Under the 
color of these laws, private individuals can often act with violent impunity 
against perceived transgressors, as any slight to a Muslim’s personal digni-
ty can be recoded post facto, presented in court as an instance of blasphemy 
against Islam. A sales call turned sour can result in a charge of blasphemy 
against the minority businessman who threw the salesman’s card in the 
trashcan, just as easily as a heated exchange between squabbling neighbors, 
coworkers, or classmates can quickly land both in court. 
In scenarios repeated across the Muslim World, from domestic arenas 
in places like Pakistan, Indonesia, and Egypt, to broader efforts like the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference Defamation of Religions resolu-
tion, a dysfunctional understanding exists as to the necessary and sufficient 
components of social order. Contrary to the prevailing belief in these coun-
tries, the data shows that a government acting (or refraining from action) to 
encourage homogenous adherence to the dominant creed at the expense of 
minority groups and individual rights is not an effective policy, if public 
order and social cohesion are the ultimate goals. Quite the contrary, in Pa-
kistan, Indonesia, and Egypt, the state-guaranteed freedom of security from 
violence, a hallmark of any ordered society, is not extended to all who be-
lieve in a faith outside of the particular vision of Islam sanctioned by the 
state. This environment encourages private actors to enforce religious 
norms through violence, intimidation, or other coercive and destructive 
means. 
C. Over-Regulating the “Marketplace of Ideas”: Dangers of Stagnation 
The violence that exists in the Muslim world does much to stifle the 
development of original religious thought, but the rioting mob is not the 
 55.  Id.
 56.  Uddin, supra note 36, at 2.  
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only agent of violence. There is a “soft violence” delivered by the institu-
tions and the academy to those thinkers who give voice to ideas outside the 
established boundaries of debate, a violence on free thought in the form of 
rejections of tenure, denials to influential posts, and the passing over of 
otherwise viable candidates for promotions. Left unchecked, this phenome-
non contributes to a society’s intellectual stagnation. 
Theorists no less prominent than Adam Smith have noted the rele-
vance of a free marketplace of ideas to authentic religious practice. In 
1776, he wrote: 
The teachers of [religion] . . . in the same manner as other teachers, may 
either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the voluntary contri-
butions of their hearers; or they may derive it from some other fund to 
which the law of their country may entitle them . . .  Their exertion, their 
zeal and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation 
than the latter . . .  The clergy of an established and well-endowed reli-
gion frequently become men of learning and elegance . . . but they are 
apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them 
authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people . . . . Such a 
clergy . . . have no other resource than to call upon the magistrate to per-
secute, destroy, or drive out, their adversaries, as disturbers of the public 
peace.57
Nothing better illustrates this than the story of Dr. Nasr Abu Zayd’s 
struggle with Egypt’s religious establishment. Dr. Abu Zayd was a profes-
sor at Cairo University, a progressive Qur’anic thinker and one of the 
foremost liberal theologians in Islam, famous for his development of a 
humanistic Qur’anic hermeneutics. He criticized the political manipulation 
of Islam, and argued that the Qur’an was not just a religious text but a liter-
ary one as well.58 This view clashed “with the mainstream Islamic idea that 
the holy book is the final revelation of God.”59 Abu Zayd’s argument was 
that Islam “should be understood in terms of its historical, geographic, and 
cultural background,” that “‘pure Islam’ did not exist and that the Koran 
was ‘a collection of discourses.’”60
After Abu Zayd applied for promotion to the rank of full professor, the 
evaluation committee’s critical reports on his work led to religious denun-
ciations.61 Religious scholars across Egypt denounced Abu Zayd; one 
 57.  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 740-741 (Modern Library Edition, Random House 
1937) (1776). 
 58.  Nasr Abu Zayd, Who Stirred Debate on Koran, Dies at 66, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/world/middleeast/06zayd.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Abu Zayd].
 59.  Id.
 60.  Id.
 61.  CLINTON BENNETT, MUSLIMS AND MODERNITY: CURRENT DEBATES 77 (2005). 
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imam even accused him of “spreading ‘cultural AIDS.’”62 Muslim scholars 
who contested the religious legitimacy of Abu Zayd’s academic claims 
initiated a trial against him63 and an Egyptian court declared him an apos-
tate in 1993.64
As a result of being declared an apostate, Abu Zayd was also declared 
divorced from his wife, Cairo University French Literature professor Dr. 
Ibtihal Younis.65 The basis of the divorce decree under Sharia law was that 
since it is not permissible for a Muslim woman to be married to a non-
Muslim man, and since Zayd was an apostate, he therefore could not re-
main married to his wife. This decision, followed by a death threat from 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad organization, caused him to flee his 
homeland and take up a professorship in the Netherlands.66
Abu Zayd was not alone in his persecution. In 1992, Islamist militants 
assassinated secular activist and author Faraj Fawda after Al-Azhar Univer-
sity accused him of blasphemy.67 In 1994, a member of an Islamic militant 
group stabbed Nobel laureate, Naguib Mahfouz, in the neck.68
In Kuwait in 1996, Ahmed al-Baghdadi, a journalist and political sci-
ence professor, was imprisoned for making insulting statements about the 
Prophet Muhammad.69 In 2000, two of Kuwait’s most prominent female 
authors, Laila al-Othman and Dr. Aliya Shoeib, and publisher Yahya al-
Rubayan, stood trial for allegedly denigrating Islam in their novels.70 In 
Lebanon in 2003, Marcel Khalife, a well-known Lebanese singer, faced up 
to three years imprisonment after “Beirut’s newly appointed chief investi-
gating judge reopened a case” that accused him of insulting Islam in 1996, 
and again in 1999, by singing a verse from the Qur’an in one of his songs.71
He was found innocent. 
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id. at 78. 
 64.  Id.
 65.  Abu Zayd, supra note 58. 
 66.  Id.
 67.  Ana Belén Soage, Faraj Fawda, or the Cost of Freedom of Expression, 11  MIDDLE EAST 
REV. OF INT’L AFF., no. 2, June 2007, at 26, 30-31. 
 68.  ABDALLA F. HASSAN, REUTERS INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF JOURNALISM, CHANGING 
NEWS, CHANGING REALITIES: MEDIA CENSORSHIP’S EVOLUTION IN EGYPT 100 (2013), available at
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/Publications/fellows__papers/2009-
2010/Changing_News_Changing_Realities.pdf. 
 69.  Mona Eltahawy, Lives Torn Apart in Battle for the Soul of the Arab World, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 19. 1999), http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/20/1.
 70.  Id.
 71.  Id.
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D. Extremism: Suppressed Speech and Radical Thought 
Governments that suppress the free exercise of religion do more than 
just erode law and order and over-regulate the free market of ideas. They 
can also contribute to the radicalization of marginalized minority groups. 
As observers of the State Department’s latest annual Country Reports of 
Terrorism (CRT)72 have noted, state actions designed to hinder the growth 
of violent religious ideologies can themselves represent human rights viola-
tions, with a high potential for unintended consequences.73
In the 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism, six country chapters—those 
on Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uz-
bekistan—go further by explicitly citing a linkage between government 
efforts to counter terrorism and limitations on religious freedom. The 
Azerbaijan chapter reports on restrictive government policies and how 
they risk increasing violent religious extremism; it concludes, “Critics 
claimed that by driving the practice of religion underground, these gov-
ernmental policies could ultimately contribute to the growth of violent 
extremism.”74
This phenomenon can be understood by looking at a historical exam-
ple. In Egypt in the 1950’s and 60’s, the autocratic presidency of Gamal 
Abdul Nasser saw numerous opposition groups, including the early Muslim 
Brotherhood, suffer brutal crackdowns as the pan-Arab leader sought to 
consolidate all power in Egypt through the systematic elimination of his 
political adversaries.75 Although the Brotherhood was initially set up to 
serve religious and social causes (preaching Islam, teaching the illiterate, 
setting up hospitals), their influence among the Egyptian populace grew 
quickly enough to concern secular rulers such as Nasser.76
After a failed attempt on Nasser’s life by one embittered Brother gave 
the leader an ideal pretext, he outlawed the existence of the Brotherhood 
outright.77 Thousands of its members were imprisoned, many being tor-
tured and held for years in prisons and concentration camps.78 The Broth-
erhood’s experiences under this repression gave birth to the ideological 
 72.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2012 (May 2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/index.htm. 
 73.  Knox Thames, Combating Religion Based Terror, GEO. J. INT’L AFF, (June 29, 2013), 
http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/06/29/combating-religion-based-terror-by-knox-thames/. 
 74.  Id.
 75.  ANNE ALEXANDER, NASSER 66 (2005). 
 76.  See Robert Leiken & Steven Brooke, The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood, 86 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, Mar-Apr 2007, at 107, 107, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62453/robert-
s-leiken-and-steven-brooke/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.
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roots of militant Islamic networks such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad.79
Sayyid Qutb, considered the founding father of militant anti-Western Is-
lamism, developed his radical ideologies while he, along with the rest of 
the Brotherhood’s leadership, was in prison under Nasser’s regime.80
II. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
Muslims must be part of the process of creating legal (as well as social 
and political) protections for intragroup dissent in Muslim-majority coun-
tries. Outside interference in the process will be perceived as irrelevant and 
even threatening.81 Therefore, Muslims reformers must rely primarily on 
intragroup texts—that is, not on international treaties or even the secular 
laws of the country, but on the foundational texts of Islam—as intragroup 
resources can underscore the religious authenticity of the reform effort.82
A. Spiritual Flourishing through Religious Freedom: American Muslims as 
Ambassadors
In stark contrast to the conditions in Muslim majority countries 
abroad, Muslims in the United States enjoy unparalleled freedom in matters 
of religion. The free and open discourse on religion that occurs in the Unit-
ed States has contributed to the development of a uniquely authentic brand 
of American Islam. The American model presents an intriguing case study 
in the evolution of Islamic thought, free from the burdens and restraints of 
Muslim political regimes. It can provide an exemplary model for Muslims 
around the globe. 
Although economic opportunity and advancement have been the pri-
mary concerns for many immigrant Muslims,83 the social and political 
79.  Id.; see also Barbara Zollner, Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle 
during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Persecution, 1954 to 1971, 39 Int’l J. Middle East Studies 411, 411 
(2007). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See Asma Uddin, Blasphemy in a Secular Democracy: The Case of Indonesia, in PROFANE:
SACRILEGIOUS EXPRESSIONS IN A MULTICULTURAL AGE (Christopher S. Grenda et al., 
eds.,forthcoming Sept. 2014).
 82.  See An-Na’im, supra note 1, at 46 (arguing that, to protect human rights in the Muslim world, 
advocates must advance alternative intepretations of the Qur’an and Sunna); Lau, supra note 1, at 532, 
535 (showing that reform efforts in non-Western parts of the world are vulnerable to being derided as 
the products of Western cultural imperialism). 
 83.  “A strong job market and economy are at the forefront of Americans’ minds, and that concern 
is exaggerated in the Muslim American population.” GALLUP CENTER FOR MUSLIM STUDIES, MUSLIM 
AMERICANS: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 39 (2009), available at http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting
/153572/report-muslim-americans-national-portrait.aspx. Thirty-five percent of Muslims in the United 
States classify themselves as African Americans while twenty-eight percent categorize themselves as 
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benefits of religious freedom have also played a significant role in the col-
lective American Muslim experience.84 As this community has grown, 
more of its members have become comfortable with political activism and 
many of them have adopted and integrated the American values of democ-
racy, individualism, and religiosity into their traditional Islamic values. 
Sharia plays an important role in American Muslim discourse; even though 
it is often narrowly understood by both Muslims and non-Muslims as a 
legal code, Sharia involves the broader process of discerning divine direc-
tives and prohibitions.85 Muslims believe that Islam’s fundamental text, the 
Qur’an, is the word of God revealed to the Prophet. Since it commands 
them to follow his example, the relevant body of literature (the Sunnah) is 
also viewed as a normative “text.”86
Historically, Islamic jurisprudence has based itself upon these two tex-
tual sources and built on subsequent scholarly works and interpretive writ-
ings. Eventually, distinct legal traditions or schools of thought (madhahib)
developed and became enshrined in popular Islamic practice. After several 
centuries, however, ijtihad (the process of interpreting divine law) stagnat-
ed as Muslims fell in line with the established schools’ legal interpreta-
tions. The existing legal system, therefore, is far more attuned to a 
medieval socio-historical context than to a modern one. 
Contemporary Muslim intellectuals, including some American Mus-
lim scholars, have taken it upon themselves to reevaluate traditional 
sources and to devise new interpretations that are relevant to the modern 
world. This fusion of the Islamic values of scholarship and divine law with 
the modern secular values of individual thought and expression has led to 
the development of a unique and dynamic brand of scholarship that is both 
truly Islamic and truly American. Arguing for religious freedom from with-
in the Islamic tradition will enable American Muslim scholars to gain legit-
imacy within the international Muslim community and, perhaps, to acquire 
a major socio-political influence abroad. 
The rise of extremist ideologies, particularly in the decade since 9/11, 
has led to an increased awareness of the need for American diplomats to 
White (which could include those of European and Middle Eastern descent), eighteen percent catego-
rize themselves as Asian, and another eighteen percent as other. Id. at 20-21. 
 84.  John Musselman, American Muslims: A (New) Islamic Discourse on Religious Freedom, 9 
REV. OF FAITH AND INT’L AFF., no. 2, 2011, at 17, 17-19 (2011). 
 85. Sally Steenland, Young Muslim American Voices: Setting the Record Straight on Sharia, An 
Interview with Intisar Rabb, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/news/2011/03/08/9263/setting-the-record-straight-on-
sharia/.
 86.  Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, 
Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67, 69-71 (2007). 
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promote religious freedom. The work of the American Muslim thinkers 
mentioned above may in fact help advance the concept of religious freedom 
within Muslim societies both on theoretical and practical levels. 
Abdelaziz Sachedina, who has written extensively on Islamic theology 
and jurisprudence as well as on the intersection of Islam, democracy, and 
human rights, argues that freedom of religion is both fundamental for 
“democratic pluralism” and deeply rooted within the Qur’anic paradigm of 
religious life in and of itself.87 He also contends that in order to realize true 
religious freedom—the freedom to choose and change one’s faith—the 
exclusivist theological frameworks of the past must give way to more in-
clusivist ones. According to him, if the Qur’an is taken to be a universal 
moral guide for humanity and each individual has the inherent God-given 
ability to discern right from wrong; its message transcends the bounds of 
religious distinction. In other words, a universal morality trumps all partic-
ular differences related to practice and spirituality and grants salvation to 
all, “regardless of formal religious affiliation.”88 Within this framework, 
recognizing the religious “other” as a spiritual equal is the key to establish-
ing true religious freedom. He therefore states, “Muslim thinkers working 
on human rights must engage in Islamic theology rather than Islamic 
law.”89
Many American Muslims who have adopted very similar notions of 
religious freedom work alongside non-Muslims on the grounds that mutual 
recognition and cooperation advance common morality in the public 
square. Muslims are engaging in interfaith activities and creating bridges 
between their religious communities nationwide in the name of social jus-
tice. This particular brand of Islam is the result of synthesizing the Ameri-
can values of democracy, citizenship, and spirituality with Islamic values. 
Umar Faruq Abd-Allah of the Chicago-based Nawawi Foundation 
calls this process the “cultural imperative,” the absolute need to develop “a 
sound Muslim American cultural identity.”90 He points out that “[i]t was a 
matter of consensus among Islamic legal thinkers that the legal judgments 
of earlier times had to be brought under constant review to insure that they 
remained in keeping with the times” and that early scholars renounced the 
“mechanical application” of Islamic law.91 In addition, Abd-Allah asserts 
 87.  ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: GUIDANCE OR 
GOVERNANCE? 13-14 (2006). 
 88.  Id. at 15. 
 89.  ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 87 (2009). 
 90.  UMAR FARUQ ABD-ALLAH, ISLAM AND THE CULTURAL IMPERATIVE 2 (2004), available at
http://www.nawawi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Articles3.pdf. 
 91.  Id. at 6. 
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that American Muslims are duty-bound to transcend anachronistic laws so 
that they can take affirmative action to produce culture: “A successful 
Muslim American culture must provide psychological space for all constit-
uents of our highly heterogeneous community”92 and “[c]ultural develop-
ment must be intentional and proactive, focused on clear and valid goals 
with a concrete vision of how to attain them.”93
True to Abd-Allah’s prescription, American Muslims have created 
multiple forms of authentic American Islamic culture. Ranging from a wide 
array of art and media, including, among others, the author’s own web 
magazine, Altmuslimah.com, to a broad reevaluation of scriptural texts, 
American Muslims have actively negotiated the relationship between their 
faith and their lived realities. By allowing space for critical thinking, the 
broad, unparalleled religious freedoms granted by the U.S. Constitution 
have facilitated a spiritual flourishing. 
The process of culture-creation is an ambitious undertaking. Honesty 
requires the community to adopt religious freedom norms not just when 
doing so benefits itself, but consistently and for everyone. As beneficiaries 
of their country’s constitutional protections, American Muslims must also 
embody those ideals and work to actualize them for non-Muslims as well. 
B. Defending Authenticity: Rooting Reform in Sacred Texts 
If the concept of religious freedom is to truly take root within tradi-
tional Muslim societies, it must be expressed in Muslim terms and argued 
from a Muslim perspective based on traditional Islamic texts. In other 
words, one does not have to dismiss traditional Islamic thought and juris-
prudence to stress the importance of freedom of belief. Fathi Uthman, a 
well-known Islamic scholar from Egypt, states: “No power of any kind in 
the Islamic state may be employed to compel people to embrace Islam. The 
basic function of the Islamic state, in this regard, is to monitor and prevent 
the forces which might seek to deny the people their freedom of belief.”94
His words are far from exceptional, as even Prophet Muhammad persuaded 
people to embrace Islam solely on its rationality and truth. In fact, all 
scholars have agreed that any involuntary or compelled confession of faith 
is invalid.95
 92.  Id. at 9. 
 93.  Id. at 10. 
 94.  See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ISLAM 87 (1997) (quoting 
the original work of FATHI UTHMAN, HUQUQ AL-INSAN BAYN AL-SHARI’AH AL-ISLAMIYYAH WA’L-
FIKR AL-QANUNI AL-GHARBI). 
 95.  KAMALI, supra note 95, at 88. 
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At a very fundamental level, sincere religious practice is incompatible 
with imitation or coercion of any sort. The Qur’an and traditions of the 
Prophet (hadith) speak volumes about Islam’s respect for personal freedom 
and the human intellect.96 The individual’s freedom to decide what appeals 
to his/her spiritual needs honors each person’s true nature, that of being 
endowed with dignity, honor, and the ability to discern between right and 
wrong.97 The attempts of contemporary Muslim states to ban proselytiza-
tion and education about other religions clearly violates the Qur’an 88:21: 
“You cannot compel them to believe.” 
Muhammad, in his dual capacity as prophet and statesman, provided 
the inhabitants of his state with an environment of tolerance, acceptance, 
and intellectual stimulation. Imposing particular beliefs stifles its very pur-
pose. Speaking to this point, Qur’an 2:170 states: 
When it is said to them: “Follow what God has revealed,” they say: “No, 
we follow the ways of our fathers.” What! even though their fathers un-
derstood naught and were not rightly-guided?
Scholars Ali Abd al-Wahid Wafi (1901-1991) and Mohammed Abduh 
(1849-1905), interpreting this verse, conclude that: 
[T]houghtless imitation which lacks wisdom and correct guidance is the 
hallmark of the disbelievers. A man can hardly be called faithful or a be-
liever (mu’min) unless he thinks about his faith and satisfies himself as to 
the veracity of his belief.98
The well-known Egyptian scholar Abdel Qadir Awdah goes even fur-
ther: not only is one obligated to pursue a faith that comports to what 
his/her mind and heart believes, but one is required to protect his/her ability 
to believe in his/her own truth.99 He states, “[I]f the person [who cannot 
practice his/her faith freely] is able to migrate and he does not do so, then 
he would have committed an injustice against himself.”100 His finding is 
based on a Qur’anic verse that rejects the “attitude of those who do not 
exert themselves, if necessary, to migrate, in order to safeguard the integri-
ty and freedom of their consciences.”101
Wafi and Awdah articulate three specific methods by which Islam en-
sures freedom of belief:102 (1) the Qur’an asserts that true faith is rooted in 
 96.  Abdullah Saeed, The Islamic Case for Religious Liberty, 217 FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2011, at 33, 
33, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/11/the-islamic-case-for-religious-liberty.  
 97.  Id.
 98.  KAMALI, supra note 95, at 105 & n.215 (quoting ALI Abd al-Wahid Wafi Huquq al-Insan fi’l-
Islam 124 (Cairo, 1967); M.R. Rida, Ta’rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam Muhammad ‘Abduh, II 207; Al Manar 
(Cairo, 1931); Abu Habib, Darasah 642).  
 99.  KAMALI, supra note 95. 
 100.  Id.
 101.  Id.
 102.  Id. at 104. 
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personal conviction and acceptance, as opposed to imitation and coer-
cion.103 As opposed to being just a “random” concept, it is a theme that 
occurs throughout the Qur’an; (2) since Islam stresses each individual’s 
freedom to follow a religion that appeals to his/her rationale and reason-
ing,104 proselytization and education about other religions should be al-
lowed;105 and (3) Qur’an 2:256 clearly prohibits forced conversion. History 
shows that most Muslim rulers adhered to this principle and permitted their 
subjects to continue practicing their own religion, as long as they obeyed 
the laws and paid the relevant military service and zakat-exempting poll-
tax (jizyah).106
Modern Muslim states have formally incorporated this principle, albeit 
in a very flawed manner, into their foundations. For example, in 1952 Paki-
stan107 announced at its 1952 ulama convention “The Basic Principle of an 
Islamic State,” which included the following clause: “The citizen shall be 
entitled to all the rights  . . . he shall be assured within the limits of the law 
of . . . freedom of religion and belief, freedom of worship.”108 In 1957, 
Malaysia adopted a similarly worded article in Article II of its constitution: 
the “Freedom of Religion” clause states that (1) every person has the right 
to profess and practice his religion and that (2) no person shall be com-
pelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole 
or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.109 These provi-
sions reflect a basic understanding that the principle of religious freedom is 
both part of Islamic theory and meant to be respected by Muslim states. 
These principles, however, are often not translated into reality. For ex-
ample, as described earlier, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Egypt have draconian 
blasphemy laws on the books that are regularly enforced against intragroup 
dissenters and religious minorities. Malaysia, too, practices institutional-
ized religious discrimination in violation of the Qur’an’s injunctions. Arti-
cle 153 of its constitution has been interpreted to privilege Muslim Malays 
over Chinese and Indian Malaysians as well as other ethnic/religious 
 103.  Id.
 104.  Id.
 105.  Id.
 106.  Id.
 107.  Id. at 89. 
 108.  Id.
 109.  Id.
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groups110 and to justify discrimination in government employment, univer-
sity admissions, and obtaining government licenses and contracts.111
Apostasy is a particularly contentious issue in Muslim countries. Ab-
dullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed’s Freedom of Religion, Apostasy, and Is-
lam lays out many of the commonly used theological and legal arguments 
against religious liberty and then outlines alternative interpretations of tra-
ditional texts in order to support broad religious freedom.112 They start 
their discussion by distinguishing apostasy from related pre-modern and 
modern Islamic concepts, such as apostasy (riddah), blasphemy (sabb Al-
lah or sabb al-Rasul), heresy (zandaqah), hypocrisy (nifaq), and unbelief 
(kufr). Although these terms’ particular definitions contain much overlap 
and ambiguity, traditional pre-modern Islamic legal sources state that all of 
them were punishable by death.113
Many early jurists used hadiths (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) 
to justify the death penalty. Modern Muslim thinkers have relied on 
Qur’anic verses as well, such as Qur’an 5:33: 
The recompense of those who make war on God and his apostle and 
spread corruption on earth shall but be that they shall be slain, or cruci-
fied, or that their hands and feet be cut off on opposite sides, or that they 
shall be banished from the land: such shall be their ignominy in this 
world. 
This verse, however, refers only to apostates who take up arms against 
God and the Prophet; it has nothing to say about those who do not do so. 
Saeed and Saeed refer to Muhammed al-Shawkani, a well-known nine-
teenth-century Qur’anic interpreter from Yemen who argues that Qur’an 
5:33 applies to anyone who “spread[s] corruption on earth,” which he con-
siders to include crimes against property and human life. According to this 
definition, personal belief has very little to do with the matter.114
Saeed and Saeed cite numerous Qur’anic verses to back up their point. 
They note that the textual basis for the death penalty for apostasy is very 
weak and more evidence exists within the Qur’an to support religious free-
dom. The Qur’an consistently reaffirms the concept of personal responsi-
bility in discerning between right and wrong. In addition, many verses 
 110.  Christopher Rodney Yeoh, Malaysia, Truly Asia? Religious Pluralism in Malaysia, in THE 
PLURALISM PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 2 (2006), available at http://www.pluralism.org
/reports/view/42.
 111.  Id.
 112.  See generally ABDULLAH SAEED AND HASSAN SAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY 
AND ISLAM (2004). 
 113.  Id. at 35-49. 
 114.  Id. at 57-58. 
662 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:2 
support the idea that belief is an individual decision and cannot be com-
pelled, among them Qur’an 17:15: 
Whoever chooses to follow the right path, follows it but for his own 
good and whoever goes astray, goes astray but for his own hurt; and no 
bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another’s burden. 
Since belief is authentic and sincere only if it originates within one’s 
self, Islam considers hypocrisy more offensive to God than unbelief. In the 
Qur’anic chapter devoted to the munafiqun (hypocrites), God refers to them 
as evil and rebellious transgressors against Himself.115 In Qur’an 4:138, He 
promises them a “grievous suffering” in the Afterlife. 
For the most part, neither the Qur’an nor the Prophet made any legal 
distinction between hypocrites and apostates, and neither source mandated 
the execution of hypocrites. Later Islamic jurists, however, differentiated 
between the two. Many modern-era Muslim thinkers have actually turned 
away from those post-Prophetic legal traditions that require capital pun-
ishment for apostasy, arguing that they do not accord with the spirit of Is-
lam or the hadith literature116 and that its socio-historical connotations have 
fundamentally shifted, as discussed above. These sorts of academic find-
ings are crucial to the protection of dissent in Muslim-majority countries. 
As in any religious debate, Muslims argue from all angles both for and 
against religious freedom. Some try to reconcile Islamic theology with 
modern standards of human rights, while others adhere to pre-modern legal 
positions. Given the rapid rate of globalization and intercultural exchange, 
as well as the need for all Muslims to have broad freedom, contextualizing 
and reevaluating the relevant traditional texts is both morally and pruden-
tially necessary. 
CONCLUSION
The ability to dissent constructively provides American Muslims with 
the tools necessary to protect similar dissent among their co-religionists 
living abroad. The widespread persecution of dissent in Muslim-majority 
countries demands a response—and the solution lies in intragroup reform-
ers relying on intragroup resources. 
 115.  Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 63: Al-Munafiqoon (The Hypocrites), CENTER FOR 
MUSLIM-JEWISH ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/063-qmt.php 
(verses 063:001-006)(last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
 116.  See generally MOHAMMED S. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW (1982); MOHAMMAD 
HASHIM KAMALI ISLAMIC LAW IN MALAYSIA (2000); see also Interview on Apostasy with Dr. Hasan 
Al-Turabi, WITNESS PIONEER, http://www.witness-pioneer.net/vil/Articles/shariah/interview_on_apo
stasy_hasan_turabi.htm (last modified Nov. 5, 2004). 
